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Abstract 
 
In this paper we present the major theoretical and methodological pillars of evolutionary political 
economy. We proceed in four steps. 
Aesthetics: In chapter 1 the immediate appeal of evolutionary political economy as a specific scientific 
activity is described. 
Content: Chapter 2 explores the object of investigation of evolutionary political economy. 
Power: The third chapter develops the interplay between politics and economics. 
Methods: Chapter 4 focusses on the evolution of methods necessary for evolutionary political 
economy. 
The conclusion positions the field of evolutionary political economy – as we proposed to establish it in 
this paper - within the wider area of scientific activity. In particular, demarcation lines towards some 
fashionable economic schools (institutionalism, behavioural economics, post-Keynesianism, etc.) are 
indicated.     
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Introduction 
 
A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of Capitalism. To paraphrase Marx famous evaluation of 
Europe’s political situation in the middle of the 19th century quite accurately describes the current 
turmoil of European politics. Extreme unemployment rates, an extremely fragile financial architecture, 
a renaissance of fascism and nationalism in several forms and many countries, all that seems to be 
further spurred by the spectre of capitalism. But while actual capitalism is omnipresent, its scientific 
justification, the ideology of the ruling class, so-called mainstream economics, is describing general 
equilibrium worlds that are completely decoupled from what happens here. Capitalist decision-makers 
in European governments are left alone and are desperately trying to extract some knowledge from 
these empty formalisms. The danger is that the spectre of capitalism is transforming into the spectre of 
fascism again. 
In this rather dramatic environment this paper proposes the research program of evolutionary political 
economy (EPE) as a means to understand the current situation, eventually even to serve as a guide for 
political intervention. To do so we are starting with a chapter on the aesthetic appeal of EPE following 
the (Hegelian) idea that you have to seduce young intellectuals to be attracted by the sea of knowledge 
to go into the water and learn swimming. Once they are in they are learning to swim by their own 
thoughts. The following chapters then describe the interplay between content of EPE, the power 
relations it describes, and the formalisms it will apply. In the conclusion we wrap these streams 
together and position our research program vis-à-vis other heterodox approaches. Though this text 
often remains to be further specified and elaborated, we nevertheless hope to convince our readers to 
join the theoretical work along the lines we propose.          
 
1. Aesthetics 
 
Evolutionary political economy (EPE) is an aesthetically appealing field of scientific activity. In the 
language of today’s youth: EPE is epic. There are several reasons for this property of EPE, the most 
important ones can easily be described. 
First of all, it is immediately visible that EPE is just the latest part of the grand approach of 
evolutionary theory, of a theory that aims to explain the emergence and further development of life 
forms, of living systems1. This high aspiration, more precisely to be an important piece in the mosaic 
of such a ground-breaking scientific project, is extremely stimulating. Even if the individual researcher 
feels small when compared to the enormous task ahead2, there nevertheless is an atmosphere of 
contributing to something substantial. This feeling exists independently of a rational evaluation of the 
capacity of the researcher, even without knowing too much about what already has been achieved; it is 
just a pre-rational feeling – and that is exactly what the classic notion of aesthetics is defining. So from 
this vantage point it is the grandeur of the scientific activity to which EPE belongs that contributes to 
the experienced beauty. 
                                                          
1 In the 19th century Charles Darwin was adding evolutionary theory as a proper scientific activity to the already 
existing successful natural sciences. Though it first was focussing on biology it nevertheless immediately 
implied a new image of the human species.  
2 Note that Erwin Schrödinger, one of the greatest scientists of his time, only dared to give his lecture ‘What is 
Life’ when he was already a well-established star in the scientific arena.  
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Contrary to a common misunderstanding beauty does not lie in the eye of the beholder3, even the 
extension that it lies in the mind of the beholder is still misleading. The experience of beauty rather 
occurs in the process of interaction with something outside the individual mind. It is a property of a 
special type of dialogue4, more precisely an interaction that leads beyond the communication level of a 
dialogue, leads from metaphysical action to physical action. It is the mirror that certain types of 
beautiful interaction enable, that they indeed create, which is attractive. Evolutionary political 
economy is a theoretical object of investigation that puts the individual researcher in front of the 
mirror that shows the evolution of the whole human species. His or her own evolution, Hegel called it 
‘Werden’ (becoming), is reflected as part of the larger social process. This typically has been stated as 
becoming conscious that the observer is part of the observation. It involves a special role of the social 
scientist, namely to take time serious, to be able to shape the future of social evolution. This new type 
of power is the core of the attractiveness of the beautiful interaction of doing EPE. The natural 
sciences that emerged in the 17th century only indirectly contributed to this task by discovering laws of 
nature that could be cleverly exploited by the respective ruling classes to enhance their power – and 
thus stimulate further social revolutions as the limits of old class settings became visible faster. 
Evolutionary political economy, emerging in the 19th century, sets out to shape social evolution 
directly. The arrow of time that occurs in the theoretical physics only in the 2nd law of thermodynamics 
and points in the direction of ever increasing disorder and properties of elements that approach the 
average, this arrow of time now is inverted by EPE, pointing to more and more sophisticated and 
specialized social organisation, to consciously shaped order (including the ‘disorder’ produced by 
innovation). Instead of discovering laws (like the natural sciences) EPE now puts time at the centre of 
its conceptual apparatus and (1) uses history to study the evolution of social laws shaping the 
respective era, (2) introduces welfare of the human species as a goal function for inventing new social 
laws, and (3) proposes ways to implement these welfare enhancing social laws. The researcher in EPE 
leaves the ivory tower (or sterile laboratory) of the natural scientist and steps out into the exciting 
arena of political struggle for a better life for all5. This is a beautiful experience. 
Closely related to the just mentioned dimension of aesthetics is another pole of attraction: 
Evolutionary political economy is neither focussing on too singular processes nor on too general 
issues. It focusses on the ‘particular’ (Hegel’s ‘das Besondere’) that lies in between. The general and 
eternally valid law of structural sciences like mathematics that makes its discoverer eternal is a non-
token as is the singular highly specialized work of a researcher developing a drug for a pharmaceutical 
firm – making this singular contribution invisible. The researcher and the contribution are less 
separated, neither the most improbable case of an eternal discovery nor a standard case of invisibility 
are the rule. Investigators in EPE can zoom-in or zoom-out with respect to their object of 
                                                          
3 This would dissolve beauty into the arbitrariness of the observing mass of human individuals.  
4 German Idealist Thought, e.g. Kant, had reduced the experience of beauty to a special type of idle observation 
of an object possessing the property to be beautiful. To gain a sharper criterion for beautiful objects a fierce 
debate on the need to exclude all useful objects, all tools, from the domain of beautiful objects was emerging. 
But the question ‘What was to be considered as a tool?’ referred back to the observer - the observer ‘without 
interest in the object’ was invented. Aesthetics typically was conceptualized for the members of a ruling class to 
encompass their leisure time activities. This is in sharp contrast to the concept of aesthetics used here.   
5 Max Weber started a desperate attempt to ignore this essential difference by postulating a distinction between 
‘objective statements’ and ‘normative statements’ that a social scientist has at his/her disposal. The ‘objective’ 
ones were meant to have the same status as natural laws, whereas the ‘normative’ ones were choices of the 
researcher based on individual attitudes or moral feelings. Despite the evident lack of scientific significance – 
see the arguments above – till today a considerable part of researchers in the natural sciences falls prey to 
Weber’s view. 
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investigation. They also might be panning their camera freely, more to the past or more towards social 
designs for the future. In doing so the community of EPE researchers nevertheless remarks the 
reappearance of generality: it reappears as the pattern of evolution-revolution-evolution-revolution- 
… Zooming-in on the time axis, on a particular era when a particular sequence of this pattern is 
occurring, reveals the particular mechanics of continuity and break. Why is such a research 
aesthetically attractive? Consider everyday life: Waves of routine steadily undermine a rock of 
dissatisfaction with routine achievements at which they break. At some point in time the rock falls and 
within a short time a new constellation emerges, new types of waves roll again against a new rock. See 
the answer to the question? It’s only Rock & Roll, and I like it! Or, taking an alternative route to the 
experience of beauty, note Adorno’s famous remark that ‘the break is the signum of modernity’. EPE 
is modern aesthetics6 since its generality reappears as the fractal structure of investigations into breaks 
between styles of social evolution. EPE as a form of modern art certainly is a refreshing perspective to 
start with. But, of course, the singular reappears too: The way it does is rather surprising since it 
builds on the fact that the researcher ‘steps out into the exciting arena of political struggle’ (see last 
paragraph). This step always is a singular step, in other words the researcher in each single case has to 
distinguish short-run tactics and mid-run strategy. Again this reappearance of the extreme form of 
singularity in EPE research corresponds closely to what scientists experience in their private life: Two 
time scales of tactics and strategy linked together into one time scale of a decision scenario7. The focus 
on the ‘particular’ thus makes evolutionary political economy research activity very similar to what 
affects individual scientists in their private life. There is an aesthetic gain based on recognizing this 
similarity. 
  Finally there is an aesthetic quality of evolutionary political economy that stems from the 
formalization needs which it entails. It is interesting to take a look at the type of formalization that 
mainstream economics celebrates. At the core the mainstream uses general equilibrium theory of 
markets, which is formalized as a re-interpretation of the (partly stochastic) general equilibrium theory 
in mechanics as developed by theoretical physics in the late 19th century. This re-interpretation goes 
back to the ideas of Leon Walras in 1874 as they were finally refined by Kenneth Arrow and Frank 
Hahn in 1967. Though this apparatus in the last half century has been mathematically fine-tuned and 
today looks awfully complicated to understand, its content with respect to evolutionary political 
economy nevertheless is still ridiculously inadequate. Its basic features, in particular the complete 
neglect of limited internal model-building and communication of social entities, cannot be expected to 
be repaired. This mistaken pseudo-scientific framework of mainstream economics is the reason why 
the general public after the financial collapse of 2008 lost any trust in the science of economics – and 
rightly so. Even though the original in theoretical physics from which the copy was taken has 
experienced a theoretical quantum jump in the first decades of the 20th century (Einstein and then 
quantum physics) these events left stubborn proponents of mainstream economics unimpressed. John 
von Neumann’s singular attempt to invent a new formal language for the social sciences, game 
                                                          
6 All ‘isms’ that start with a ‘post-’ (post-modernism, post-Keynesianism, post-autism …) just express that they 
are helpless to name what they can offer. They thus have to use the name of what they pretend to have overcome, 
and timidly add the pre-fix ‘post’ since their property to be later is their only raison d’être. Usually they are just 
minor updates or downgrades of the original. Evolutionary political economy is firmly rooted in modernity. 
7 The classic in this area was written by a German theorist of military strategy, Clausewitz [Clausewitz, 1834]. 
Till today fruitful theoretical work in this field comes from classic studies in warfare, e.g. the theory of Colonel 
Blotto Games. 
  
5 
 
theory8, remained incomplete and in the hands of his followers degenerated into a sub-discipline of 
standard mathematics. Only when the age of computer simulation started and this type of modelling 
became a respected member of the set of formalization tools, only then the renaissance of the 
formalization of evolutionary political economy became possible, became even necessary. With this 
tool the plethora of so-called ‘technical simplifications’ (e.g. assuming away all communication 
processes and limits of information processing capacities) became largely unnecessary, even internal 
model-building of sub-programs representing social entities could be mimicked. In the last decades 
evolutionary political economy entered a new era. This is exciting, and it leaves mainstream 
economics behind, since even its representatives are pre-occupied with the task to justify their obsolete 
results with the help of the new toolbox – if they accept the new tools at all. As this process becomes 
more visible with every year of crisis (in the global economy as well as in theory) even veterans in 
mainstream economics now start to re-emerge as EPE scholars. And here comes the aesthetic appeal: 
Social scientists of the younger generation grew up with new information and communication 
technologies; they all know how to program, they all saw the tremendous global change in life-style 
brought about by mobile telephones and the internet. For them the new toolbox of agent-based 
simulation – and the revival of game theory enabled by this toolbox – is not a terra incognita. This is 
their everyday formalization approach. Evolutionary political economy can thrive on the smart and 
easily understandable simulations its unique formalization device enables. And this technology-driven 
renaissance of EPE first only needs the high propensity of computer geeks to program! At this point 
the euphoria for the new dimension of aesthetic appeal badly needs a caveat. A formal language alone 
is always insufficient to guarantee adequate scientific modelling. (Preliminary) success always hinges 
on the combination of empirical observation and (eventually formal) scientific language. In the case of 
EPE this implies an analysis of the history of the respective political economy phenomenon as well as 
the force of abstraction necessary to propose new welfare-increasing solutions. In both respects 
computers increasingly help, but (so far) cannot replace genuine scientific work of the social scientist. 
Another, though even more speculative aspect of the general advance of science has to be mentioned 
that might constitute an additional aesthetic quality of EPE for some: Quantum physics has changed 
our view of the working of nature fundamentally – though the vast majority of social scientists seems 
to be not aware of this fact. At the research frontier of science, under the overlapping headers of 
‘theoretical physics’ and ‘microbiology’ theory development is in turmoil. Even the implications of 
the classic formulation of quantum theory of the late 20-ties of the last century seem to be not fully 
understood. Can social science afford to ignore theoretical – and encompassing formal – developments 
in the natural sciences? Is it sufficient to work with (low order, stochastic) differential equation 
systems and toy models of computer simulations? Should the research frontier (in methods and 
content) not rather be shifted to areas where social science can actively learn from other sciences? Of 
course, it does not make sense just to copy certain formalisms and to redefine names of variables, like 
the general equilibrium theory procedure of the last century. But to get stimulated by the idea of the 
light-particle dualism, the probability issues of Heisenberg or the deep insight of the Pauli principle 
should be a good advice. For a handful of young researchers in evolutionary political economy it 
might feel well - aesthetically - to work eventually at the top of all science, conquering indeed a terra 
incognita. 
                    
                                                          
8 See [Hanappi, 2013b]. 
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This little tour de force through arguments meant to convince young and old social scientists to 
study evolutionary political economy without knowing in the first place what it is, i.e. to provide an 
aesthetic approach to the field, this attempt now has to be followed by a description of the actual 
content of our field of science.  
          
2. Content 
 
All social science starts with a look back on the history of living systems, using an increasingly 
scientific language to describe it. This chapter concentrates on what is to be described, i.e. on history, 
while chapter 4 focusses on the evolution of the languages used. But social science is more than just a 
chronological description of what had happened in the past. To be a science means to elaborate the 
essence of what is historically observed. Simple perception has to be enriched by interpretation, i.e. by 
grafting patterns, a system of causal relationships, onto the chaos of impressions. By filtering received 
perceptions and proposing patterns as being essential, scientific work becomes useful for the society of 
which it is part of. The scientific proposal gains importance since it promises to guide actions to take 
advantage of patterns repeated in the future. The logic of ideas applied to filter observations therefore 
frames the current use of scientific results, in this sense all science carries an ideological component. If 
the scientific community is part of a society and its object of investigation is its political economy, 
which itself is constituted by different classes, then it is evident that also the use derived from science 
will point to different directions: The scientific community will fall apart, and pretty much so along 
the lines of class divisions9. 
What makes our approach to evolutionary political economy a very special approach is that its long-
run orientation makes it possible to make emergence and disappearance of classes, i.e. their finite 
dynamics10, part of the theory itself. The particular interpretation of these finite dynamics as 
evolutionary dynamics hints at Darwin’s approach in biology: The evolution of species, i.e. 
emergence, adaption, and disappearance of species, follows the changes of the environment these 
species live in, an environment that itself is continuously changing – and not the least so because of 
the activities of the species which it houses11. Evolutionary theory of living systems understood in this 
manner consists of both, biology and evolutionary political economy. As an immediate consequence 
the borderline between the two disciplines has to be discussed – from an evolutionary perspective, of 
course, namely as an endogenously emergent break. 
But before this type of break is discussed it is useful to take a look at the break from non-living 
systems to living systems. This is interesting because current mainstream economic theory comes in a 
mathematical disguise that has been borrowed almost completely from 19th century mechanics 
                                                          
9 The existence of different schools of economic theory is not just an indicator of a premature state of this 
science, it also reflects the fact that each social scientist is part of a specific social class. E.g. Keynes’ theory 
implicitly accuses the class of rentiers while trying to save fragile finance capitalism from collapse with the help 
of the state faction of the ruling class. Keynes was personally involved in stock exchange activities.   
10 The concept ‘finite dynamics‘ shall indicate that these dynamics include entry and exit of variables, i.e. the 
property of variables to be essential for the dynamics is finite. To determine the set of variables sometimes has 
been considered as ‘qualitative research’, while the development of the quantities that a set of variables is 
assuming has been labelled ‘quantitative research’. Evolutionary theory embraces the pulsation of the alternation 
of both. 
11 Darwin’s view of mutual adaption as the source of continuing diversity was in stark contrast to the dominant 
ideology of the ruling classes of his time, Christianity, which interpreted the development of mankind as part of 
an asymptotic process towards an ideal devised by the church mirroring a supernatural being - God. 
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(compare [Smith and Foley, 2002]), a theory of non-living matter12. The two central laws of this ‘old 
physics’ go back to Newton and are known as the two laws of thermodynamics. 
Roughly spoken, the first law of thermodynamics states that in a closed system the sum total of energy 
is constant. Note that this statement introduces two abstract concepts, which are immediately set in a 
strict relationship: The ‘closed system’ and the ‘sum of energy’.  On the one hand it is explained what 
is to be seen as a closed system, namely a system in which the sum total of energy remains constant, a 
definition quite independent of the question if such a system exists. On the other hand the new concept 
energy is introduced as a measurable quantity, occurring in different forms, but due to its 
measurability open to aggregation. The different forms of energy and their laws of transformation 
(culminating in Einstein’s E = mc2) then clearly constitute the core of ‘old physics’. Closure and 
quantitative constancy therefore build the conceptual frame within which its laws – without a special 
role13 of the concept of time – have been formulated. 
To replace an evolutionary notion of time by a fully reversible time counter enables a mathematical 
treatment producing eternally valid laws (valid at the level of abstract thoughts, of course) that is of a 
fascinating rigorousness and clarity of issues. Mathematical treatment and the conjecture of physical 
science in practice often were the same process. Nevertheless the fact that physical science was not 
only rooted in rigorous mathematical methods but also in results from experimental laboratory work 
soon led to the discovery of the deficiencies that the elimination of evolutionary time had brought 
about: The description of dynamic developments of non-living matter remains unsatisfactory. As a 
remedy the first law of thermodynamics was amended by a second law of thermodynamics, which 
makes explicit use of the irreversibility of time in postulating a long-run increase of entropy. The 
newly introduced concept of ‘entropy’ again (like ‘energy’) describes a measurable property of the 
system14; but now the law does not refer to constancy and closure, it instead postulates a stochastic 
law of an (with time) irreversibly increasing entropy. Again this law links new concepts allowing for 
an interpretation in different causal directions. Underpinning the concept of entropy is the hypothesis 
that there is a dynamic microstructure that has to be modelled more in detail to allow for the 
understanding of the transition from one level of entropy to the next. A causal interpretation starting 
with this dynamic microstructure would then see a well-defined entropy is causing the decrease in 
entropy in the long-run. The other way round – and in parallel - the way in which structure is to be 
described can be seen as a consequence of the increasing disorder observed in the first place15. 
But note that there is a third innovative element in this 2nd law of thermodynamics, the innocent-
looking adjective ‘stochastic’. It expresses that a sequence of observations made over a finite time 
period might well contradict the law, it only is approached as time horizons become ever longer. With 
                                                          
12 Today econophysics is so attractive for economists because it at least provides formalisms of up-to-date 
theoretical physics to be applied in economics. Every newly emerging field, like evolutionary political economy, 
should be eager to incorporate appropriate innovative language elements. 
13 Time is just a quantitative counter, each law works forward and backward in time, i.e. time is reversible.  
14 Entropy can be understood as a measure of how similar a certain set of properties (e.g. speed and average free 
path length) of elements (e.g. molecules) within a system (e.g. a gas in a vessel) is. What happens in the short-
run remains in the dark of murky and complicated non-linear dynamic systems theory, but in the long-run the 
stochastic law of increasing entropy drives the set of properties to the same average values. The situation 
towards which the system converges clearly reminds on the assumption of the ‘representative firm’ in standard 
microeconomics. 
15 Already half a century ago Henri Theil had used this long-run averaging tendency to construct measures for 
economic inequality in distribution [Theil, 1967]. In this context the stochastic long-run tendency towards 
increasing entropy postulated in physics can be understood as a tendency towards equalisation of incomes in 
political economy. Might this be a stochastic, long-run measure of progress? 
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the introduction of this new irreversible time dimension finally probability theory entered the stage of 
scientific inquiry16. From that moment on the distinction between certainty and probability of issues 
concerning non-living systems started to frame what probability theory is about – right across the 
different jargons of cognitive science and epistemology and the distinction between deduction and 
induction. What has to be kept in mind is that till today standard probability theory follows the needs 
to describe non-living matter17.    
At this point an important idea of the eminent physicist Erwin Schrödinger has to be mentioned. In his 
book ‘What is Life?’ [Schrödinger, 1944] he argues as follows: If the second law of thermodynamics 
is valid and if living systems are a subset of all systems (if living systems have a purely physical 
dimension), then it is straight forward to characterize living systems as those systems that decrease 
entropy! Since this is only possible as a counter-movement to the still valid 2nd law of 
thermodynamics, it can only occur during the finite time-span that the adjective ‘stochastic’ of this law 
permits. The phenomena of birth and death, i.e. begin and end of this time-spam, are intrinsically 
linked to living systems. In between birth and death so-called negentropy can occur and processes can 
build-up structures and can organize the elements of the living system, which thus temporarily resists 
the long-run tendency of all matter. The details of how this is possible, of how the sequence of 
different steps of this resistance against increasing entropy emerge, this is precisely what evolutionary 
theory is trying to investigate. Today the physicist Erwin Schrödinger therefore often is considered to 
be one of the first ancestors of modern microbiology. In more profane words: Biology of fauna and 
flora is part of evolutionary theory as well as any social science. All parts of this science of living 
systems try to understand the steps of the build-up process of the order of systems – first descriptive 
only, later with the goal of using this knowledge for intervention in the future course of events. 
Charles Darwin’s pivotal insight was to direct the focus of research towards the fact that evolutionary 
processes are characterized by coming in rather abrupt steps – in time as well as in space. His concept 
of the species is used to name a certain step of an evolutionary development that takes place in a well-
defined spatial environment during a well-defined time period. Where these steps come from, how a 
certain step makes the next one possible and probable, this is already announced as a major topic of 
research in the title of his book ‘The Origin of Species’ [Darwin, 1859]18. 
It is interesting to consider how the two laws of thermodynamics (non-living systems) would look if 
they would be inverted, i.e. seen from the perspective of evolutionary theory (living systems). The 
negation of the closure of the system would be the self-generating sequence of ever-changing life 
forms. To get an idea of the negation of the constancy of energy a closer look at its role is necessary: It 
is a device to measure an abstract property ascribed to a particular observable. Moreover it shall be 
possible to aggregate, to sum-up the amounts of this property of different observables. The straight 
                                                          
16 Ludwig Boltzmann has been the incarnation of this unity between ‚old physics‘ and the new theoretical 
innovation of probability theory. By taking his new combination of the two theory fragments to the limit, he 
prepared the ground for ‘new physics’ – a perfect example of (Schumpeterean) innovation in science. 
17 Of course, these needs also are continuously changing. The newly emerging quantum electrodynamics induced 
several innovations in probability theory.   
18 Darwin’s view was a stark provocation of Christian ideology: He postulated that the progressive order systems 
of species are self-generated by these systems, a clear contradiction to the Christian dogma that the human 
species alone is on a long-run trail of catharsis to become ideal, i.e. the mirror image of God – and that this 
investigation is the central topic of science. Since Darwin knew how dangerous his work was for the Christian 
dogma he delayed the publication of his book for more than ten years. But even more important is that - like 
Marx with whom he had a friendly correspondence - Darwin recognized that it is typical for changes from one 
step to the next that this metamorphosis occurs in a relatively short time span. In Marx famous formulation: 
Revolutions are the fast trains of history (‘Revolutionen sind die Schnellzüge der Geschichte’).   
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forward negation in evolutionary theory at first sight is the non-constancy, the continuing, stepwise 
decrease of entropy19. But change of a measurable quantity needs more specification than the postulate 
of constancy, it asks for rules describing how the decrease takes place, how a more of structure is to be 
formalized. Instead of boiling down changes in structure to a single number it would be wise to refer 
here to the possibilities of algorithmic descriptions of the different living systems. Life forms are 
getting more and more sophisticated and complicated in their structures, their increasing complexity 
mirrors decreasing entropy. Steps of decrease come with steps of increase in complexity, and the latter 
can rather be imagined as steps in the size and structure of a network than as a jump in a single 
number. It is thus the sequence of stepwise increase of network complexity (described in algorithmic 
language, i.e. simulation) that takes the place of a negation of the concept of energy in the inverted 1st 
law of thermodynamics. Contrary to this evolutionary negation of closure and constancy of energy, 
mainstream general equilibrium theory is formulated precisely along the lines of non-living matter: In 
a closed space of commodity owners (closure) with measureable, well-behaved utility functions 
market forces produce a unique vector of exchange relations leading to a unique and constant optimal 
sum of utilities (constancy). 
In the 2nd law of thermodynamics the three central new concepts were the dynamic microstructure, 
which has a measurable property called entropy, and the property of the rule to be a stochastic rule. 
Since it postulates a long-run continuous process its negation should start with a short-run stability 
consideration. How can a relatively stable stage that a living system in its development of order has 
reached be described20? On the one hand there must be stabilizing forces at work that drive the system 
back to its dominant structural setting if small disturbances from the environment disturb it. On the 
other hand the reasons for the metamorphosis to the next step must also be slowly developing during 
the still stable current step. Somehow their still inessential accumulation and slowly accelerating 
visibility must also be an endogenous element of the current stage. Each stage thus contains stabilizing 
as well as destructive forces – and they are linked to each other. The inversion of the 2nd law therefore 
leads to the introduction of a new central concept: contradiction. As Lucio Colletti already elaborated 
40 years ago it is necessary to distinguish between real opposition and dialectical contradiction 
[Colletti, 1975 (1977)]. In the material world forces can point in (at least partially) opposing 
directions. Each of these forces does not cease to exist if all of the other forces stop. The further 
development of the system depends on the specific interdependencies between these partially opposing 
forces, these real oppositions. On the other hand the dialectical contradiction is an element in the 
sphere of language. It only can influence the material world via its influence on the actions of the 
material carriers of language. A dialectic that remains with its self-negation dynamics in the sphere of 
language can at best produce only new words21. To become an evolutionary force language therefore 
had to be developed into an action-guiding tool shared by its physical carriers. Since only the homo 
sapiens has evolved a language that goes far beyond the simple impulse-reaction mechanism used in 
all other species, it is possible and advisable to restrict the inversion process to a subset of 
evolutionary theory, namely to evolutionary political economy22. The following reasonable speculation 
                                                          
19 One of the first proponents of this idea, Georgesu-Roegen, after a first being euphoric later in his life rejected 
the usefulness of entropy in economics .[Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 1987] 
20 Compare in this context the concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’ used by Per Bak [Bak and Sneppen, 1993]. It 
was developed somewhat earlier by Stephen J. Gould [Eldridge and Gould, 1972]. 
21 A word becomes a concept if it proves its impact on the world outside language. 
22 This statement derives the position of evolutionary political economy as a part of evolutionary theory using an 
evolutionary argument. It is named ‘political economy’ since it treats processes of direct exertion of power 
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can be added: During each evolutionary stage there is enough time and space for the development of a 
network of institutions. These social devices are tools to shift disturbances caused by local real 
oppositions back in time (e.g. postponing) and in space (e.g. to courtyards). In this way the working of 
institutions can contribute to the temporary stabilization of the evolutionary stage; it can spread and 
can prolong its existence. This process will be called crystal growth. The introduction of time in the 
2nd law of thermodynamics now, in the inverted (the evolutionary) perspective, appears as the 
occurrence of time limits: Real oppositions can be shifted or split into smaller parts by institutional 
frameworks23 and the stage of crystal growth can be enlarged. But in the end the real oppositions 
cannot disappear – and this is the full inversion of the 2nd law of thermodynamics – it is their totality 
of contradictions that enters the shared consciousness of the species, which then can lead to an 
evolutionary jump, to a social metamorphosis. Several important issues are touched upon by this 
sketch of a possible inversion of the 2nd law of thermodynamics: 
 In an evolutionary perspective at least two different time horizons have to be considered: A 
short horizon within which the processes of crystal growth with its (mainly) stabilizing 
institutional framework takes place, and a long horizon that enables to include the 
countervailing destructive force of slowly accumulating real oppositions, which finally lead to 
an evolutionary jump. This formal requirement should imply the adaption of new formal 
techniques, e.g. network theory (needed for the description of increasing complexity) and 
fractal analysis24 (for adding additional time horizons).    
 The network of institutions25 that is at work during the crystal phase shifts and splits real 
oppositions, tries to digest the contradictions of this evolutionary stage. In the course of these 
processes institutions also adapt, to the limits set by this stage, to the problems they have to 
‘solve’. What emerges could be called the culture of this evolutionary stage. It then is exactly 
this broad cultural diversity, which constitutes the material needed in preparation for the next 
evolutionary jump of society. Large scale - historical - social innovation taking place as 
metamorphosis uses visions produced by new combinations of known older elements. And 
these older elements are usually fragments of the cultures of bygone crystal growth stages. 
This evidently is the second essential role that institutional frames play, they contribute to 
historical experience from which new combinations, new visions for the improvement of 
society are emerging. They are a historical laboratory of memories on experienced conflict 
treatment.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(politics) as intrinsically interwoven with economic processes embedded in such a political setting. Note that this 
view is shared with the classical British authors of the 19th century. Keynes macroeconomics is only a pale 
shadow of this much broader approach.     
23 In a sense this is the bright side of what Kafka describes in ‘Der Proceß‘ [Kafka, 1915]. Note that there are 
also contradictions that only appear as real oppositions though they are not, and therefore can eventually be 
completely eliminated. 
24 A good starting point for the understanding of fractal analysis are the memoirs of its most prominent 
proponent, Benoit Mandelbrot [Mandelbrot, 2012]. A classic text on network theory has been published by Mark 
Newman [Newman, 2010]. Furthermore a revival of game theory with the original tenets of Neumann and 
Morgenstern – now called algorithmic game theory – can be expected to provide additional formal tools 
(compare [Newman and Park, 2003]).  
25 Institutional economics therefore is an important subset of evolutionary political economy. Traditionally the 
phenomena not covered by classical microeconomics and classical microeconomics, lying somewhere at a meso-
level, were researched under this title (compare [Dopfer, Foster, and Potts, 2004]). Our definition of institutional 
economics is more aspiring and goes beyond the purely phenomenological level. 
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 But metamorphosis to set in needs more than just the still existing mass of accumulated 
unresolved real oppositions. These explosive circumstances must become visible und 
interpretable26 by a relevant share of individuals in the concerned society. Only if a latent 
metamorphosis is transformed into a vision of a possible radical improvement, a vision held 
by a share of the population powerful enough to initiate a break, only then the metamorphosis 
can become manifest. The dialectic occurring as a tool in language to express contradictions 
thus can be understood as a means to get hold of possible visions, which in turn are a pre-
condition for a revolution solving the set of real oppositions. 
Each of these topics could only be briefly characterized, nevertheless showing how much work still is 
waiting for research in evolutionary political economy.  
 
The proposed research program for evolutionary political economy implies work on the formal 
apparatus that has to be used – a purely narrative style is inadequate - as well as a re-interpretation of 
history from an evolutionary perspective. A first simple periodization of the last 200 years showing the 
alternating stages of crystal growth and metamorphosis is shown in figures 1a-1c. Development 
evidently takes place in a sequence of pushes. Isomorph evolutionary dynamics can be found on 
different time scales and in different geographical scopes too. 
 
Figure 1a 
 
It is this fractal structure on which the mentioned tools of fractal analysis can be applied. Self-
similarity in space can take a look at regions, or at continents, or at the global political economy. Self-
                                                          
26 The classic historical example of vision building has been the French Enlightenment that prepared the 
bourgeois revolution. Karl Marx’ efforts as a late representative of enlightenment aimed to stimulate 
immediately the next revolutionary break, carried by what he saw as the overwhelming part of population, the 
proletariat. 
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similarity in time might analyze hours, days, months, years, life times, business demography times, 
ages etc. During the crystal phase growth mechanisms in both dimensions are emerging. The adjective 
‘crystal’ was chosen because - like in a crystal – growth takes place by putting new copies of the 
structure side by side27.                      
Metamorphosis is different. It often is characterized by a loss of memory, wild efforts to escape from 
chaos, and application of sometimes far-fetched analogies to arrive at new visions. The break with 
history might allow the jump to the next evolutionary stage, but it also bears the risk of a quick and 
final failure of the species. 
With this preliminary characterization of the object of investigation of evolutionary political economy 
the pieces of the puzzles to be put together are spread out in front of future ‘organic intellectuals’ 
(compare Antonio Gramsci’s concept) needed to produce a more complete picture. 
 
Figure 1b 
 
                                                          
27 The recent tendency of single human individuals to behave like capitalist firms (organisations formed by many 
persons) can be interpreted as spatial self-similarity, while reducing daily leisure time is self-similar to reducing 
life expectancy after retirement in the time domain. Both types of spreading central mechanisms are omnipresent 
in today’s society and express the (overdue) crystal growth stage.   
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Figure 1c 
 
   
3. Power 
 
In order to understand the (a) synchronicity of capitalism in time and space – as it appears in political 
economic phases of crystallization and metamorphosis – we suggest a specific interpretation of 
institutional change. This understanding is synthesized from the American original institutional 
economics, Marxist conceptions of institutions as given by the French regulation school and selected 
works by the French social philosophy of the late 20th century. The point of departure for such an 
analysis is given by “conflict rather than harmony” as Gruchy [Gruchy, 1973, p. 623] elaborated 
once. As already argued in the previous sections, the aesthetics of an EPE approach is given by its 
focus on the particular that lies in between, respectively, the particular object of interest in the matter 
of conflict-driven institutional change between the poles of politics and economics is clearly the 
structure of power.  
As a first aspect of power we aim to highlight institutional, organizational and economic power that 
rises through growing oligopolies, able to influence the course of national as well as international 
economic development. In his presidential address to the American Economic Review in 1973, 
Galbraith [Galbraith , 1973, p. 2] famously argued that “in making economics a non-political subject” 
economics “…destroys its relation with the real world.“ Elsewhere Galbraith [Galbraith , 1967] has 
developed a concept of economic power that goes beyond the traditional understanding of bargaining 
power in perfect competition, rather it involves “…power to impose corporate decisions on 
consumers, the community, and the state.” as Gruchy [Gruchy , 1973, p. 643] explains. This aspect of 
power appears only within an industrialized capitalism where large-scale corporations have absorbed 
“…a large share of the nation’s educational and research activities… Having control of much of the 
nation's resource of scientific and technological expertise, the large industrial enterprises are in a 
strong position to influence the course of national economic development.” (ibid.: 634) Industrial 
capitalism brought forward different species of corporations as famously observed by Galbraith 
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[Galbraith , 1967]. “There is an inner area or sector of large-scale oligopolistic industrial enterprises 
and an outer sector of small-scale mainly competitive enterprises. The outer area functions very much 
as does a market economy in the manner indicated in all standard economics textbooks…In the inner 
heartland of the economy relations between the giant corporations and the state are close, and profit 
maximization is secondary to the expansion of sales and the enhancement of the corporation’s power 
and prestige.” Gruchy [Gruchy , 1973, pp. 629-630]. The calculus of utility maximization may fit well 
for the small-scale enterprises fighting for survival, because “economic power is largely contained by 
the market system” but “in the inner sector corporate power extends to the oligopolistic markets, the 
consumer in them, and the state.” (ibid.). Conclusively, on the one hand the neoclassical economic 
apparatus comes too short in their political economic analysis because it builds upon the competitive 
economy where the size of enterprises is reduced and political as well as legal power minimalized in 
order to get a system with almost no economic power. On the other hand it fails to analyze economic 
development as a conflict-laden process in a broader Schumpeterian understanding of social 
development [Schumpeter, 1911]. Today this realm of power faces an additional layer that makes 
things even more complex, it is the layer of finance. Toporowski [Toporowski , 2010, p. 920] argues 
that international capital market integration has led to an even newer species of economic 
corporations, i.e. the “financially enhanced transnational company“. This novel type of companies 
orientates its power not on production output and revenues but on its financial appraisal, its 
shareholder value. To this extent its operations are at least evenly dependent on financial 
intermediaries as on traditional production input such as capital and labor, but we can refer to a a new 
mode of accumulation ([Boyer, 2000] and [Tabb, 2010]) as also shown in the previous section . 
Additionally to finance, we are confronted with a second viable source of power on the institutional 
and oligopolistic level. This source stems from controlling the co-evolutionary process of society-
nature relationships. We follow Kapp [Kapp, 1977] who makes a decisive argument for the economy 
as an open system. As Berger and Elsner [Berger and Elsner, 2008, p. 83] outline, Kapp’s open system 
approach emphasizes the “interaction with the natural and the social systems and focuses both on 
physical and biological, and institutional interactions between the economic system and its 
environment.” He looks into the direct consequences of physical and biological theories of open 
systems for economics, such as the entropy law. The latter implies that “…the economic process, from 
a physical point of view, basically is an entropic transformation since it transforms low into high 
entropy, which is irrevocable waste” [Berger and Elsner, 2008, p. 84]. Therefore economic processes 
are ontologically part of evolutionary change and are thereby irreversible by nature and non-replicable 
in terms of perfect copies. Otherwise Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen emphasized that life accelerates 
entropic transformation, and (even more drastically) that “[t]he present biological spasm of the human 
species – for spasm it is – is bound to have an impact on our future political organization. … My 
reason for the last statement is that, like Marx, I believe that the social conflict is not a mere creation 
of man without any root in material human conditions” [Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 306]. 
Georgescu-Roegen  is rather pessimistic about the potential elimination of conflict on multiple levels 
of social, economic and political organization in the future. He believes in the material basis of social 
conflict and for that very reason deemed it counter-intuitive that its elimination can be made on behalf 
of human decision or by the social evolution of mankind. However, Georgescu-Roegen [Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971, pp. 316-322] brought some significant conclusions forward related to his historical 
materialism and the dialectic nature of accumulation processes in political economy. First of all, the 
idea of boundaries of economics should be given up and, therefore, also the boundaries of the 
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economic process, a notion that was firstly addressed by the German historical school but made 
prominent by Marx and Engels. In contrast, “[t]he non-Marxist economists apparently believe that by 
proving the existence of some natural boundaries for the economic process they will implicitly expose 
the absurdity of historical materialism and, hence, its corollary: scientific socialism” [Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971, p. 316]. In a quite similar vein, Kapp [Kapp, 1977, p. 528] argues that “…the 
disruption of the environment and its protection raise problems of such complexity that no single 
academic discipline within its present boundaries can hope to make significant contributions to their 
solution without at least a basic familiarity with the knowledge of other relevant social and natural 
sciences. For this reason it is necessary that social and natural scientists concerned with 
environmental problems and policies engage in transdisciplinary research.” Kapp [Kapp, 1977] 
mentions the potential power of institutions capable of monitoring the society-nature relationships and 
capitalizing them. Stirling [Stirling, 2014] highlights this aspect even more in elaborating on the two 
potential transformations of the political economic system in light of energy choices. In order to 
understand these complex interdependencies and create counter hegemonies it seems intuitive to 
follow Georgescu-Roegen (1971) who argued in favor of transforming economics into a dynamic and 
realist science as the approach of EPE emphasizes. “It is nevertheless true that lessons, perhaps the 
only substantial ones, on how to transcend the static framework effectively have come from Marx, 
Veblen and Schumpeter”. [Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, p. 321] 
As a second aspect of power we aim to highlight endogenous power and its omnipresence. The 
starting point for an analysis of transformation dynamics is given by conflict and its power relations 
rather than harmony and consensus, as indicated by institutionalists [Gruchy, 1973] as well as 
Marxists ([Hobsbawm, 2012], [Palermo, 2014]). This aspect is revealed by the agonistic nature 
[Mouffe, 2000] of political struggle that leads to dynamic change and transformation in political 
economy. Institutional interdependencies between individual actors and social structures lead to 
endogenous changes in the economy and some of them have even labelled this process evolutionary 
[Veblen, 1898]. Thorstein Veblen argued that institutional evolution is channelled through cumulative 
causation of habits of thought. The major driving force behind this process is given by the dichotomy 
of instrumental versus ceremonial proclivities. These proclivities are conceived as instincts by Veblen 
that can be either supportive in terms of progress as in the case of the “instinct of workmanship”, 
“parental bent” or “idle curiosity” or obstruct constructive properties along “practices of exploit, 
prowess or mastery (warfare), ownership (material acquisition), and in pecuniary control of industry” 
[Tool, 1977, pp. 825-826].  Institutionalists basically argue that the latter human urges or drives are 
not subject to practical reason but are instead of ceremonial character and may prohibit change, i.e. 
enforcing institutional inertia. On the contrary, Tool [Tool, 1977, p. 825] explains “Observing the fact 
of social change from his anthropological reading, Veblen, as did Karl Marx before him, sought 
inclusive and continuously applicable theory to explain that change. The evolutionary development of 
institutional forms appeared to him to parallel the Darwinian account of the evolutionary development 
of life forms. Veblen sought to identify those modes of thought and behavior which promote or provide 
for the continuity of culture and those that tend to impair or obstruct developmental cultural 
continuity.” The dynamics emerging from the coexistence of ceremonial and instrumental are always 
conflict-laden and transform political economy, because the former is based in authority and the latter 
“denotes performance based upon belief informed by causal reasoning” as Klein and Miller [Klein 
and Miller, 1996, p. 268] highlight. The crucial element in this process is given by the habits of 
thought that are forced to adapt to a continuously changing institutional landscape. As emphasized by 
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Brown [Brown, 1991, p. 699], the Veblenian habits of thought evolve out of a combination of 
experience and the societal setting. Facing these circumstances, social and environmental movements 
seem to be too marginal to invoke any change at all. In particular, social movements face significant 
problems in making the transition from cultural change to institutional change eventually [Castells 
2009, p. 300]. But as highlighted by Laclau and Mouffe [Laclau and Mouffe, 2014] with reference to 
the Foucauldian understanding of power “…wherever there is power there is resistance… if we 
recognize that there is a large variety in the form this resistance takes.” Laclau and Mouffe [Laclau 
and Mouffe, 2014, p. 136]. In this Foucauldian tradition power is understood as bio-power that 
appears as endogenous population control [Foucault, 1974]. Michel Foucault has dedicated much of 
his work on the evolution of the sovereignty society to the disciplinary and control society eventually. 
This aspect is truly relevant for an EPE approach, since the different organizational structures and their 
power regimes influence the mode of governmentality in society, determining the potential for 
progress or inertia. Most prominently the transition from the disciplinary to the control society was 
very exemplary shown by Deleuze [Deleuze, 1993, pp. 254-262] who elaborated on the contradictory 
word couples of “closure and opening”, “analogous and numeric language”, “factory and 
enterprise”, “individual and dividual” as well as “energy and information”. Gilles Deleuze has 
argued that the old sovereign societies dealt with simple “mechanical machines”, the youngest 
disciplinary societies dealt with “energetic machines” and the newest control societies operate with 
machines of a third type, i.e. “information machines” Deleuze [Deleuze, 1993, pp. 254-262]. This 
notion guides us directly from power to our last topic of the EPE approach, that of formal language 
and method. 
 
4. Methods 
 
It is an analytical device, though one that cannot be circumvented, that an object of investigation and 
the language used to describe this object of investigation have to be separated. Everyday parole, 
written language, and more formal languages exist independently of the societies which they try to 
describe. But they are not pre-existing; they are just results of social evolution. As a consequence 
evolutionary political economy – taking this argument serious – necessarily sets out to revolutionize 
the language, which should be used by social scientists28. In the moment this probably is the most 
important impact on existing mainstream theories. Since these theories are stuck in their quest for the 
correct difference-differential equation system that finally unearths the eternal truth of social 
interaction – and in doing so freezes intellectual capacities of many well-educated thinkers – 
evolutionary political economy methods indeed are a scandal. To accept them would immediately 
devaluate the painfully acquired (useless) knowledge of 90% of leading mainstream academic 
economists. So take a look at the evolution of methods in the social sciences. 
 
As already elaborated in section 3, each scientific approach is tightly connected with a language and 
the methods that it is using and applying. The language of classical political economy was nothing else 
than the precise use of prose until the turn-around towards marginalism in the year of 1874 (compare 
                                                          
28 This is the reason why John von Neumann set out to invent a formal language for the social sciences, i.e. game 
theory. This is clearly stated at the beginning of his epochal book [Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944], compare 
also [Hanappi, 2013b]. 
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[Screpanti and Zamagni, 2005]). Scholars aimed to analyse the totality of societal development in this 
non-formalized language. It seems appropriate considering Karl Marx as the last representative of 
classical political economy. His work describes the industrial capitalism of his time in such precise 
terms that with this analysis one could conceive the historical progress as well as the future fall of 
capitalism. As Marx needs to be considered also as a representative of the enlightenment – why else 
should he have spent so much effort on writing texts – his science seemed to appear dangerous for the 
ruling class.  
 
Marginalism, an economic theory developed to oppose Marx as well as the German Historical School 
– Leon Walras, Stanley Jevons and Karl Menger – needs to be understood as an attempt to radically 
change the vocabulary - the alphabet - of the classics. Even when we associate some singular 
marginalists with a kind of socialist thought (e.g. Walras), the marginalist counter revolution was 
welcomed by the ruling class (the wealthy bourgeoisie had arranged itself with the political leadership 
of the aristocracy after 1848). The concept of marginal value became the significant core of what is 
called “economics” thereafter and the political dimension of any economic mechanism was eliminated 
as already discussed in section 2 in the context of power. It is particularly noteworthy that the 
language structure of the new economic mainstream shifted from the precise use of prose towards 
analogies and metaphors drawn from classical physics and its rather simple mathematics of differential 
calculus at the end of the 19th century. Atoms become human individuals and their relations are 
interpreted as differential equations with individualized psychological variables, compare [Schmidt 
and Foley, 2002]. It is essential that the concept of social class gets eliminated and the object of 
investigation of the classics (following Marx, the dynamic development of class conflict) gets replaced 
by a rather flat model of exchange relations between commodity owners, the dynamics mirroring the 
equations of mechanics known in the 19th century (compare [Milonakis and Fine, 2008]).  
 
To this day, this method of masking the foundational first steps of modelling (i.e. the proper selection 
of relevant concepts) with a complicated looking formal apparatus is still the most popular dodge of 
immunizing inadequate theory. This jargon was accompanied by ever more difficult entry barriers to 
learn it and thereby the references to the real world behind the variables could hardly get 
reconstructed.  In the meantime this cognitive interpretation process is even not considered as 
necessary anymore for academic careers. The development of microeconomics towards the present 
pure canon of methods is inherent in the marginalist counter revolution. The intermezzo of Keynes’ 
revitalized view on the economy as a whole – considered as macroeconomics in his diction29 – had 
been owed to the first wave of marginalist analytical failure in terms of economic policy. In the year 
1936 follows Keynes’ main work [Keynes, 1936] as a response to the Great Depression. The influence 
of Keynesian economic policy led furthermore to the development of the first globally acting 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions become 
                                                          
29 The use of the word ‚macroeconomics‘ shows that Keynes just wanted to add a complementary piece of theory 
to ‚microeconomics‘. This amendment was meant to re-introduce the most powerful instrument of the ruling 
class, the state, into economic analysis, an element that had been eliminated by marginalism. In times of 
undisputed dominance it had been sufficient for the ruling economic ideology to propagate inadequate models to 
confuse and to divert critical thinkers. But as soon as a severe crisis occurs ruling ideology also was needed to 
provide adequate consulting for economic policy. This was exactly what Keynes offered – and some Keynesian 
models offer today. An additional reason for the popularity of his innovation (even in social democracy circles) 
was that the labour movement already had conquered several positions in the state apparatus.  
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important to support and maintain the integrated corporate model of capitalism (compare [Hanappi, 
1989]). In parallel new interesting methods were developed meeting the demands of regulation (e.g. 
Leon Hurwicz’ “mechanism design”, [Hurwicz, 1973]) as well as the consideration of agents’ internal 
model building (e.g. John von Neumann’s “game theory” and the “theory of automata” [Neumann, 
1928, 1966]) through transforming them into formal innovations in the mid of the 20th century. 
However the after-war period of crystal growth (compare section 2) leads to a deep consolidation 
phase of the mathematics preaching mainstream and the initiated formal innovations are faded out – 
compare [Hanappi, 2013] and [Leonard, 2010] for a detailed history of game theory. As a consequence 
the unification of micro- and macroeconomics can be considered as the first great methodical project 
after the war. In phases of crystal growth political intervention is not really on the agenda, so this 
project, named “microfoundation of macroeconomics”, remained on the theoretical level, while 
economic policy could get along with some simple heuristic rules. Basically the theoretical project 
failed because of the necessity of strict microeconomic assumptions revealing the complete lack of 
contact with reality. These assumptions were however necessary as axioms since what was to show 
was a rigorous mathematical and correct aggregation of microeconomic variables to obtain issues on 
the macroeconomic level. Optimal welfare properties of a pure market economy had to be proved on 
that level. This notion holds foremost for assumptions concerned with information processing and 
communication between agents. The last attempt of saving “microfounded macroeconomics” can be 
found in the school of rational expectations – assuming almost ridiculous assumptions about the 
human cognitive apparatus – that became fashionable at the end of the 1970-ties30. Since that time 
mainstream economics got more and more lost in methodical impasses. Still policy-makers usually 
don’t recognize this fact since they are not driven by economic science but by the needs of 
transnational corporations. A turning point in this game is marked by the creative use of these methods 
by finance managers who have redirected the uncontrollable exploitation of accelerated centralizing 
capital towards the stock exchange. The most critical moment of this process is still not too far in the 
past, in 2008 the fictive game of symbols was flung back to the material world with the real 
consequences of unpaid debt. In this moment of imminent crisis the cry for adequate theory became 
louder, wasn’t it somehow possible to stabilize integrated capitalism. Keynes gets resurrected, Kalecki 
and Minsky rediscovered, although their methodical standards and assumptions nowadays only allow 
just interesting inspiration31. 
 
However mostly unrecognized by mainstream economic theory a revolution of methodical as well as 
methodological possibilities took place in the last 50 years. New language structures move beyond the 
scope of equilibrium concepts imprisoned in Newtonian mechanics and are largely connected to 
computational simulation. It is thereby not a coincidence that formal language moved from prose 
(classical political economy) to mathematics (neoclassical economics) and eventually to algorithmic 
science (evolutionary political economy). We have illustrated the different categories in table 1. 
 
                                                          
30 It then has been further supported by the Reagan administration for rather obvious reasons.  
31 For a more detailed discussion of Keynesianism versus Evolutionary Economics compare [Hanappi, 2014b]. 
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LEVEL PROSE MATHEMATICS ALGORITHMS 
0 bits bits bits 
1 words variables objects 
2 sentences equations statements 
3 texts equation systems programs 
4 sets of texts sets of systems sets of programs 
 
Table 1: Language structures [Hanappi, 2007] 
 
In particular the agent-based methodology opened a new spectrum of analytical endeavor that 
emphasizes the generative aspects of modelling actors instead of factors in computational social 
science [Epstein, 2006]. [Miller and Page, 2007] explain that the scope of bottom-up simulation can be 
a game changer for analyzing transformation processes in society since it addresses the important role 
of time and space among other issues (table 2). 
 
Traditional Tools Agent-Based Objects 
precise flexible 
little process process oriented 
timeless timely 
optimizing adaptive 
static dynamic 
1,2, or  ∞ agents 1,2,…, N agents 
vacuous spacy/networked 
homogenous heterogeneous 
 
Table 2: Modell potential of the bottom-up approach [Miller and Page, 2007, p. 79] 
 
These methods wait for concrete simulation experiments as well as projections of real-utopian visions 
in evolutionary political economy, because they allow a proper treatment of EPE core concepts such as 
knowledge, power and social class through the generative approach32. First attempts in this direction 
are given by agent-based models of institutional change (e.g. [Elsner and Heinrich, 2009], [Heinrich, 
2014] [Wäckerle et al. , 2014]; compare [Gräbner, 2015] for an introduction and overview) and the 
novel field of agent-based macroeconomics (e.g. [Cincotti et al. , 2010], [Delli Gatti et al. , 2011], 
[Riccetti et al., 2013], [Chen et al. , 2014], [Rengs and Wäckerle, 2014], [Seppecher, 2012] with a 
focus on labor markets, [Dosi et al. , 2013] emphasizing capital goods, banking and innovation, and 
[Lengnick, 2013] with a benchmark model). The crisis created a scientific space of methodological 
opportunity motivated by frustration with hegemonic neoclassical economic theory (the economic 
theory of the ruling class) and it is this vacuum of adequate explanation that can get conquered by 
evolutionary political economy with novel methods and a concretely defined object of investigation.  
 
                                                          
32 In this context Hanappi proposed to understand capitalism as a particular algorithm, the capitalist algorithm, a 
reframing of the historical discourse into a language that is easily amenable to agent-based simulation (compare 
[Hanappi, 2013a]). 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The proposal how to understand content and method of evolutionary political economy given above – 
to call it a definition runs counter the evolutionary character of this scientific discipline – seems to be 
operational enough to guide future research. Of course, it is rather aspiring since in perspective 
evolutionary political economy is promising to lead to a unified synthesis of all contemporary social 
sciences, it aims at being the future mainstream social science. In its critique of today’s more or less 
sophisticated set of mathematical exercises that proclaims to be mainstream economics our approach is 
not alone. In the last 40 years several (some call them ‘heterodox’) approaches have been emerging 
and it is necessary to position evolutionary political economy (EPE) vis-à-vis these attempts33. 
With respect to Institutional Economics its role as a part of EPE has already been mentioned above. 
To describe the institutional framework of a crystal growth stage and to show how it is able to stabilize 
it, while some slow underground contradictions are continuously at work, this difficult task should 
constitute its main focus34. A second important future role that will need more attention is the goal to 
provide the essence of past ideas for new combinations that lead to visions for future institutional 
frameworks35. That Institutional Economics is only a part of EPE becomes evident as soon as the 
endogenous entry and exit of institutions comes into play. Where, why and when institutional 
frameworks emerge can only be systematically discussed from a wider perspective36, from an EPE 
perspective. 
Another fashionable new approach is Behavioural Economics. Its appeal stems mainly from its 
opposition to the assumption of rational expectations made by the school that (misleadingly) called 
itself New Classical Macroeconomics (following Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, see [Sargent, 
1980]). In the context of the methods of EPE described above this critique boils down to the 
assumption that the agents in ABE models of EPE use internal models that are not necessarily equal to 
each other and not equal to what afterwards happens in their interaction. For EPE this is a rather trivial 
issue that (in other words) already had been emphasized by Herbert Simon in his numerous 
contributions to ‘Bounded Rationality’ since the 50-ties. Only in contrast to the completely inadequate 
assumptions of mainstream models Behavioural Economics could appear as new, as a ‘new’ refreshing 
alternative. But while its main tenet (the existence of independent internal models) is also part of EPE, 
                                                          
33 To highlight differences to the mainstream approach see [Hanappi, 2014a], this also is implicitly done in the 
previous parts of this paper; compare also [Fine, 2013]. 
34 A recent debate on the what should be considered as an institution in the Journal of Institutional Economics, 
vol 11, No.3, shows how vivid and still in its infancy this field is. From the point of view of EPE the idea to 
consider an institutional framework as a network of algorithms based on internal models maintained by 
heterogeneous social agents with the effect of stabilizing a crystal growth phase could be contributed to this 
discussion. What goes beyond the horizon of the current institutionalist discourse is EPE’s insistence on 
destabilizing, only slowly becoming visible destructive elements of the same stabilizing process, i.e. 
contradictions in institutions. The intervention of algorithmic language - so far only scarcely imported there as a 
‘rule-oriented approach’ - might clarify dramatically the place of institutionalism as part of EPE. 
35 In this respect research in political science is ahead of Institutional Economics. A good example is a paper on a 
proposal for rotation in office [Goodin and Lepora, 2015]; see also the following discussion in the same journal.  
36 The consideration of the viability of singular institutions certainly lies within the competences of Institutional 
Economics, but as soon as social classes as movers of a society that eventually enters a metamorphosis phase 
enter the stage, as soon as this happens it goes beyond the horizon covered by Institutional Economics. Once 
metamorphosis has set in Institutional Economics becomes interesting again in its second subaltern role (see 
above), providing purified historical experience for visions. 
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it does not provide the same rich context from which EPE derives this property of social agents37. 
Where EPE insists on a modelling of information production and perception of information, the 
standard treatment in Behavioural Economics escapes to the measurement of empirically observed 
actual behaviour, e.g. in ‘Behavioural Finance’. Thus Behavioural Economics can provide interesting 
contributions to EPE with respect to the necessity to model internal model building, but it is running 
into an impasse if it postulates its single methodological idea of ‘behaviours’ (actions based on 
different internal models) as an economic paradigm; this idea simply has to be embedded in a broader 
understanding of the content of the object of investigation. The borderline between Behavioural 
Economics and EPE therefore typically occurs where the characterization of the behaviour of a single 
type of agent ends; beyond the single profile Behavioural Economics remains mute, while EPE starts 
to become particularly interesting. 
    An even more interesting case then is Post-Keynesian Economics. The pre-fix ‘post’ only 
indicates that Keynes ideas have more recently been amended by some additional elements. Keynes 
had re-introduced the state as an agent in economic affairs, which in a sense was a remarkable return 
to political economy. He even had ascribed ‘behaviour’ to the state - that is to the part of the ruling 
class that was in charge of fiscal and monetary policy. He then proceeded by ascribing ‘behaviour’ to 
another faction of the ruling class, the firm owners, by assuming that they use an internal model to 
determine (independently) their investment decisions. In describing the interaction between the two 
class factions of the ruling class (sometimes plus a third faction of ‘rentiers’) and the workers he went 
quite a bit towards a prose version of an agent-based story38. Post-Keynesian Economics tries to 
further refine this story by looking more closely at the behaviour of these class factions, e.g. by adding 
capacity utilization as another essential variable in the internal model of firm owners, or by splitting 
up working class behaviour into employment goals and wage-increase goals. A main objective of 
Post-Keynesian Economics often is to overcome ‘Bastard Keynesianism’, a variant of Keynes 
interpretations that started with Hick’s IS-LM modelling in the 40-ties and culminated in the Keynes 
model found in Thomas Sargent’s book propagating New Classical Macroeconomics. Given the fact 
that today still most of the macroeconomic models in use are (more or less ‘Bastard’-) Keynesian, 
demand-driven models the group of Post-Keynesian Economists comes in a variety of formats – closer 
to these policy-oriented models, or closer to Keynes text, or trying to start anew in a Keynesian spirit. 
The deficiencies of Post-Keynesian Economics in comparison to EPE – forgetting for a moment that in 
some areas it can contribute important insights to EPE – are basically twofold: (1) The class dynamics, 
which Keynes observed and started to analyse concern only the decades of the interwar period; and the 
amendments produced usually also remain within the short-run horizon of Keynes historical political 
goals. (2) His other theoretical innovation, namely the emphasis on the importance of aggregate 
demand in an economy of circular flows (with certain accounting identities), focusses only on the need 
to protect the circular movement from disturbances – any progressive role of ‘creative destruction’, 
e.g. coming from technological or social revolutions, is out of question39. Due to these limits of 
                                                          
37 The role of mass media for internal model building can hardly be over emphasized. To study this type of 
ideological institutions is an important part of EPE. An interesting recent contribution in this area is 
[Cunningham, Flew, and Swift, 2015] though they present a somewhat distorted picture of evolutionary 
economics. For a debate on ideological alienation compare also [Hanappi and Hanappi-Egger, 2014]. 
38 Perhaps the special talent of Keynes to give economics a new start was spurred by the fact that he was one of 
the few famous economists of the past who was not ‘spoiled’ by a proper economic education; his career was 
that of a politically interested economic practitioner.   
39 Only Richard Goodwin and some of his followers have tried to combine Keynes ideas with Schumpeter’s 
disequilibrium proposals, see [Hanappi, 2015] for a detailed discussion. 
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attention – to the long-run as well as to deeper importance of dis-equilibrating actions - the role of 
contradictions as a moving force of political economy is out of sight. So while many interesting 
arguments are produced by the increasing number of post-Keynesian economists, they all fail to 
produce a grand picture of the historical evolution within which they could be fully understood. This is 
exactly the theoretical environment which EPE tries to produce. 
Finally an approach has to be mentioned, which goes back to a scholar who never wanted to form a 
school: Joseph Alois Schumpeter. Neo-Schumpeterean Economics in several respects claims the 
opposite of Schumpeter’s contemporary Keynes. The overwhelming importance of technical progress 
that Schumpeter - like Marx40 - tried to root in the social circumstances that enable it, this dominance 
of the process of innovation is at the centre of neo-Schumpeterean research. Starting with this focus 
Neo-Schumpeterean Economics explores several interesting economic fields: (1) As the driving force 
of innovation the abstract concept ‘entrepreneur’ is studied41. Note that this driving force acts in 
opposition to market forces and thus produces contradictions. (2) Since technical advance always 
emerges in a single economic branch first, then dragging the rest behind in a bandwagon effect, the 
analysis needs to introduce a sectoral view that produces a more concise picture of the economy. There 
is the idea that similarly described waves of innovation with different lengths of period are overlaid, a 
kind of fractal structure, a methodological element also typically for EPE. (3) Schumpeter as well as 
most Neo-Schumpeterean economists lay heavy emphasis on political implications and economic 
policy. Research is part of the economic process that is investigated42. The Schumpeterean camp thus 
usually is split along the lines of major social class differences43. Again this conscious participation in 
the political process is shared with EPE. The borderline between Neo-Schumpeterean Economics and 
EPE therefore is a bit blurred. It probably is most visible in the tendency of Neo-Schumpeterean 
Economics to narrow down the problems of evolutionary political economy to questions of innovation 
– and the ‘entrepreneur’ carrying out some technical or organisational improvements. While this task 
certainly has led to an expertise in innovation research, the broader embedding of this special activity 
– the historical mission of capitalism, as Marx and Schumpeter postulate – in the general social 
evolution often gets out of focus. 
       As this brief synopsis of its demarcation lines shows, the research program of Evolutionary 
Political Economy is trying to build a coherent framework out of many valuable theoretical elements 
to be found in the works of the grand scholars of our discipline. It is aiming at a new theoretical 
combination, an innovation in theory, which is capable to guide political and economic decision-
making; it considers itself as a conscious part of the progressive development of our species. It thus is 
also part of contemporary class dynamics, in other words it is an eminently political activity – like it, 
or not. 
                                                          
40 Neo-Marxism, as another possible heterodox approach, is not dealt with since it currently cannot be 
sufficiently identified. The prevailing neo-Ricardian interpretation of some of Marx ideas in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature has not yet been reconciled with the bulk of other influences of Marx work in other languages and 
other social science sub-disciplines. Having said this it is nevertheless clear that Marx theory influences and 
stimulates evolutionary political economy profoundly. 
41 A few researchers in managerial economics still try to find ‘entrepreneurial spirits’ in exceptional human 
individuals, despite the fact that Schumpeter himself already had said good-bye to this idea in the 40-ties.  
42 In contrast, ‘Bastard Keynesianism’ insists on the neutral validity of its arguments - citing Keynes, who once 
wrote that economists should be like good dentists: Just do the right thing! This statement, of course, is just 
another communication tool masking intentions to support a certain policy.  
43 Schumpeter himself was on the side of productivity increasing entrepreneurs, with some nostalgic coquetry 
with respect to the feudal class. In the 80-ties the neo-Schumpeterean International Schumpeter Society was 
clearly divided into two camps, one on the conservative side and one on the socialist side. 
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Moreover the way necessary to approach its content implies an adjustment of the formal apparatus – 
even the introduction of newly emerging tools- to be able to describe its phenomena. EPE is forced to 
participate in the revolution of formal tools of social sciences that currently takes place. That happens 
with the sciences of non-living systems since 200 years, it now starts to happen with the sciences of 
living systems. Out of the enormous amount of new formalisms that have mostly emerged from 
advances in information science and information technology, evolutionary political economy has to 
select, collect, and combine those techniques that seem to be most appropriate for its content. The 
feedback from the content will then allow for a progressive dialectic between content and 
formalization. This is already taking place and the global division of theoretical labour enabled by the 
internet is starting to create what Antonio Gramsci would have called a global organic intellectual 
[Gramsci, 1930]. 
The research program sketched above therefore is part of a global process of emancipation in which 
emerging knowledge contributes to design the future. It is very urgent to push forward this research 
program since evolution works with suddenly necessary pushes, with metamorphosis and revolutions. 
If a blueprint – the vision of a better global society – is not available in time and this blueprint cannot 
guide the way of class dynamics towards this vision, then it might well be that the species meets a 
dramatic fall back. This historically observed possibility of biological species has been expressed in 
much more profane words many decades ago: ‘Socialism or Barbarism’.              
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